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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the dichotomy between the public and private sectors has
blurred, or perhaps collapsed entirely.' Reflecting this trend, state governments
frequently contract with private prison facilities to help absorb the alarming
increases in prison populations. In analyzing qualified immunity questions,3 the
Supreme Court has never strictly relied upon public or private status distinctions
in determining whether to grant qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§
1983") actions;4 the Court's functional approach demonstrates its hesitance to look
1. Examples of the trend toward privatization of traditional government services include the use
of private security as a means of providing law enforcement services and the use of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms as a way to supercede civil court proceedings. See E.S. Savas, Privatization and
Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 890-93 (1987) (discussing the privatization of traditional government
services).
However, in the context of prisons, one criticism of privatization is that "'[the presence of a profit
motive results in private prisons substituting the goal of the general welfare of society with the goal of
profit maximization."' See John G. DiPiano, Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the
Twenty-First Century, 21 NEwENG. J. ONCRIM. &CIV. CONFINEMENT 171, 198 (1995) (quoting Joseph
E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 649,662 (1987)).
2. See generally DiPiano, supra note 1, at 198 (describing the recent explosion of the United
States' prison population and the development of private prison facilities as an alternative to state
incarceration).
3. Qualified immunity shields its beneficiaries from liability from suit under certain
circumstances. See generally Charles T. Putnam & Charles T. Ferris, Defending a Maligned Defense:
The Policy Bases of the Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 665 (1992) (discussing how qualified immunity protects individuals from
liability). Immunity doctrines recognize that a government acts through its employees or agents and
that, in order to ensure smooth operation of the government, "those who carry out governmental
operations must ... be immune [from civil suit under certain circumstances]." See id. at 680.
4. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
149
only upon an employee's status in analyzing immunity questions.' However, the
modem explosion of privatized governmental services, particularly privatized
prisons, complicates the Court's functional approach to qualified immunity.
6
In light of these concerns, the Supreme Court recently adjudicated Richardson
v. McKnight.7 In Richardson, a prisoner brought suit against private prison guards
under § 1983.8 The prisoner alleged violation of his constitutional rights because
the guards had placed him in excessively tight restraints. 9 However, the Court
declined to extend qualified immunity to the private guards in light of historical
precedent denying immunity to private jailers and marketplace pressures that
distinguished private prison guards from their state counterparts. 0
A. The Requirements of a § 1983 Action
The aim of § 1983 is to prevent persons acting under the guise of state
authority from depriving other individuals "'of their federally guaranteed rights.""'
Moreover, it provides a remedy when a person's constitutional rights have been
violated. 2
Section 1983 provides for two distinct groups of defendants: those exposed
to personal liability and those organizations that "[employ] the accused agent." 3
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1996). In practice, § 1983 is a civil rights statute which provides a remedy
when officials, acting pursuant to legal authority, deprive persons of their constitutional rights. See
generally John F. Wagner, Jr., J.D., Annotation, Availability of Qualified Immunity Defense to Private
Parties in Action Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 95 A.L.R. FED. 82 (1989) (discussing the operational
aspects of § 1983).
5. See infra notes 43-45, 56-57, 107, 123-25, 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's functional approach to immunity questions).
6. See Putnam & Ferris, supra note 3, at 672-73 ("[§ 1983's] original purpose was to allow for
the redress of constitutional violations, either performed by or with the acquiescence of state and local
governments .... ). However, moden qualified immunity analysis arguably "'rests on functional
categories, not on the status of the defendant."' Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2109 (1997)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983)).
7. 117 S. Ct. 2100.
8. See id. at2102.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 2106-08.
11. See id. at 2103 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)); supra note 4 and
accompanying text (discussing § 1983).
12. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2103. However, a deprivation or violation of constitutional
rights will not always rise to the level of actionable behavior under § 1983. See Putnam & Ferris, supra
note 3, at 676. Torts which resemble § 1983 violations receive varying treatment depending upon a
given jurisdiction; therefore, § 1983 litigation remains complicated in application. See id.
13. See Putnam & Ferris, supra note 3, at 674. When asserting either type of § 1983 action,
plaintiffs must prove that the rights denied them are personal in nature; moreover, a corporation is
ineligible to assert another's constitutional rights as personal in nature. See id. at 675. Furthermore,
plaintiffs must also prove that the fight denied to them was "a Federal right secured either to the federal
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In order to state a valid § 1983 claim to impose personal liability, a potential
plaintiff must establish the following: (1) the action at issue was committed under
color of law, (2) a person acting under the badge of state authority perpetrated the
action, and (3) a causal link between the actions and a deprivation of constitution-
ally or federally protected rights.14 Likewise, to state a § 1983 claim against an
entity employing the person allegedly violating § 1983, the plaintiff must prove the
same three elements in addition to showing that "a policy or custom attributable to
the entity must have been the moving force behind the deprivation."'5
B. Qualified Immunity: Its Theoretical Basis
Absolute immunity typically involves completely insulating a governmental
employee's exposure to liability,"6 while qualified immunity typically involves
limiting the same.' 7  Specifically, qualified immunity protects governmental
officials undertaking discretionary tasks to the extent that "their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."' 8  Courts often extend qualified immunity to
governmental employees "to provide [them] ... with the ability [to] 'reasonably
... anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages."" 9
However, it remains unclear whether qualified immunity protects private
Constitution, federal statutory law, or federal regulatory law." See id. at 676.
14. See id. at 674.
15. See id.
16. Courts will often extend absolute immunity where subjecting a governmental official to
liability would detract from that individual performing his duties and expose such official to "'unlimited
harassment and embarrassment."' See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,423 (1976) (holding that the
District Attorney acted within the scope of his duties in prosecuting a criminal case and thus was
entitled to absolute immunity) (quoting Pearson v. Reed, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (1935)). Although the
theoretical underpinnings of absolute and qualified immunity are nearly identical, absolute immunity
often encompasses distinct and narrow classes of persons acting in an official capacity. See, e.g., id.
(listing judges and jurors as classes of persons acting in an official capacity which usually receive
absolute immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (holding that state legislators are
entitled to immunity while acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activities).
17. In determining what type of immunity to apply, courts have determined that immunity will be
extended "no further than its justification would warrant." See Harlow v.Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811
(1982) (holding that presidential aides are usually only entitled to qualified immunity). Also, a
defendant must plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. See id. at 815.
18. See id. at 818 (establishing the criteria for granting qualified immunity) (citations omitted).
19. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,646 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,
195 (1984)).
defendants. 20 In Richardson, the Court turned to historical precedent and public
policy to determine that qualified immunity did not extend to private prison
guards.21
C. Public Prisons Versus Private Prisons
Prison privatization advocates cite cost savings as one of the primary benefits
of privatizing the public prison system. 22 However, a recent study suggests that
private prisons also have a lower recidivism rate than do their public counterparts."
Regardless of the pros and cons of private prison facilities, private industry has a
certain degree of flexibility which enables it to create innovative solutions to
operating prisons.
Private prison companies build prison complexes from scratch, which enables
them to construct state of the art facilities.24 These prisons greatly eliminate the
security problems inherent in the outdated designs of many public facilities, while
allowing fewer private prison guards to effectively and efficiently maintain order
among the prison population.25 Because private prison companies are able to shop
around for construction companies, they are able to construct prison facilities more
rapidly than states.26 Operation as a whole is much cheaper in a private prison than
in a public one because union rules and civil service constraints simply do not
20. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158,162 (1992) (holding that rationales mandating qualified
immunity for public officials do not extend to cover private individuals). Under a purely functional
approach, qualified immunity should extend to private parties performing analogous duties to their
public counterparts where such counterparts receive qualified immunity. See Richardson v. McKnight,
117 S. Ct. 2100, 2109-10 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Conversely, opponents of extending qualified
immunity to private parties argue, in part, that competitive market pressures and a profit motive face
private parties; these nullify qualified immunity's rationale in the private context. See id. at 2106-07.
21. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2104-07.
22. See Betsy Z. Russell, The Handle, SPOKESMAN REv.,Jan. 11, 1997, atB1. For example, Idaho
Governor Phil Batt will look to private prison facilities to accommodate a growing prison population
because of cost considerations. See id. The Governor also favors private prisons because building state
prisons is a lengthy process which cannot meet the needs of a state with a ballooning prison population.
See id.
23. See John D. McKinnon, Private Jails Seen Cutting Recidivism, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1998,
atFl. A recent study of Florida's inmate population indicated that those incarcerated in private prison
systems have fewer subsequent run-ins with the law than do those incarcerated in public jails; 10
percent of inmates released from private prisons were arrested again, while 19 percent of inmates from
the public prisons were arrested again. See id. Yet critics of this study argue that the private-prison
industry heavily funded this research and that the private prisons incarcerated only the best-behaved
inmates from the public prison system. See id.
24. See Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 359, 382 (1996).
25. See id. The preferred design for modem prisons is "[olne or two story structures with security
control in the center, straight hallways extending out from the security control, and modem electronic
surveillance systems," See id.
26. See id. at 383. In fact, the typical amount of time spent constructing a public jail is anywhere
from two to five years, while a private construction company can construct a jail in one and a half to
two years. See id.
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apply in the private context.27 Furthermore, private prisons can obtain supplies
from the sources with whom they negotiate the best price.28 Thus, private prison
companies have all of the freedoms of private industry and few of the constraints
facing public prison operators.
D. Richardson v. McKnight: The Public or Private Dichotomy Is Alive
and Well
By denying private prison guards qualified immunity from § 1983 actions,
Richardson, albeit a limited holding, reaffirmed the importance of a public/private
dichotomy in analyzing immunity questions. In addition to the theoretical
ramifications of Richardson, this Note will analyze how Richardson will affect the
private prison system and prisoners' constitutional rights. Part II examines the
Supreme Court's historical interpretations of qualified immunity in the context of
§ 1983 actions as well as the history of prison privatization.29 Part III discusses
Richardson's factual and procedural background.3° Next, Part IV examines the
Court's majority and minority opinions.3' Part V addresses the decision's practical,
political, and constitutional significance.32 Part VI concludes by suggesting that
Richardson will not open the floodgates to prisoners bringing lawsuits, but will
rather improve prisoners' civil rights.3
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Qualified Immunity in a § 1983 Context
1. Immunity from § 1983 and Its Common Law Antecedents
Tenney v. Brandhove3 is the seminal case establishing that certain defendants
27. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2107 (1997).
28. See Gold, supra note 24, at 383-84.
29. See infra notes 34-86 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 94-134 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 135-167 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
34. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
can assert immunity from § 1983 actions.35 In Tenney, Brandhove brought suit
against several members of the California legislature alleging that their speech
denied Brandhove his federally guaranteed rights.36 The Supreme Court
emphasized the tradition of legislative freedom in this country and determined that
by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 187 1,3 Congress did not "mean to overturn the
tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil War and carefully
preserved in the formation of State and National Governments here. 38 Thus, the
Court implicitly found that Congress did not intend to reject all common law
immunities.39 Subsequent cases from the Court have limited immunity to the types
of immunity existing at common law.4"
To counterbalance concerns that immunity might thwart the civil rights
policies underlying § 1983, specifically that government officials could abuse their
powers to deny persons their clearly established constitutional rights, the Court
added a policy prong to its historical analysis of immunity.4 In doing this, the
Court equally weighed the reasons for immunity, such as the efficient functioning
of governmental operations, and the policies behind § 1983, such as concerns that
governmental officials not be allowed to use their powers to deprive persons of
constitutional entitlements.
42
2. Examining Immunity with a Functional Approach
Although the determination of granting qualified immunity often empirically
breaks down upon public or private lines, the Court usually employs a functional
35. See id. at 379. In addressing legislative immunity, the Court reasoned that a legislator is the
people's representative, and in order to represent the people fully and successfully, absolute immunity
is appropriate to protect the legislator's liberty of speech. See id. at 373-77 (citing JAMES WILSON, n1,
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed. 1896)).
36. See id. at 369.
37. Section 1 of this statute has been modernly codified as § 1983. See Robert G. Schaffer, The
Public Interest in Private Party Immunity: Extending Qualified Immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
Private Prisons, 45 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1055 (1996).
38. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
39. See id.; see also Schaffer, supra note 37, at 1055 (arguing that Tenney "interpreted section
1983 to incorporate all immunities existing when Congress enacted section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871").
40. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); see also Schaffer, supra note
37, at 1055-56 (discussing the historical limits of immunity under § 1983).
41. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158,167 (1992) ("Qualified immunity strikes a balance between
compensating those who have been injured by official conduct and protecting the government's ability
to perform its traditional functions") (citations omitted); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
421 (1976) (arguing that in determining questions of immunity under § 1983, courts should weigh the
historical rationale for immunity against the policies underlying § 1983).
42. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); see also supra notes 16-21 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's practices in determining whether to grant qualified immunity
from § 1983).
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analysis in examining immunity issues.43 That is, the Court analyzes the function
that the official charged with a § 1983 violation performs and looks to see if that
function merits immunity."4 The Court then uses a functional approach to
determine whether absolute or qualified immunity should be applied to the
official.45
3. The Modern Test
Early cases limited the application of qualified immunity.46 This body of
jurisprudence required that the totality of the circumstances suggests the persons
allegedly violating § 1983 believe in the correctness of their actions. 4 However,
the subjective nature of this test led to inconsistent application in the lower courts.48
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,49 the Supreme Court adopted an entirely objective test by
holding that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."5 Subsequently, in the context of a Fourth Amendment
question, the Court determined that it was the responsibility of lower courts to
define what constituted "clearly established law."5
43. See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325. 342 (1983) (stating that "our cases clearly indicate
that immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant"); Harlow, 457
U.S. at 810-11 (holding that under a functional approach, immunity of governmental officials
"extend[s] no further than its justification would warrant"); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247 (1974) (looking at a police officer's responsibilities rather than his status as an officer in
determining whether he should receive immunity).
44. See Schaffer, supra note 37, at 1056.
45. Judges, legislators, prosecutors, and presidents traditionally receive absolute immunity for
tasks performed within the scope of their duties. See Putnam & Ferris, supra note 3, at 690. Law
enforcement officials and executive branch officials usually receive qualified immunity for discretionary
tasks performed within the course of their employment. See id.
46. See, e.g., Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 248 (applying a totality of the circumstances test to determine
whether persons allegedly violating § 1983 believed in the correctness of their actions).
47. See id. Early on the Court established a two-prong test that denied immunity when the persons
charged with a § 1983 violation knew or reasonably should have known their actions denied a person
clearly established constitutional rights or if the alleged violators maliciously intended to deny a person
such rights. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975). Problematic in this line of
reasoning, however, is that it called for courts to ascertain an official's subjective mind frame, which
is an issue of fact appropriately within the jury's fact-finding duties. See Putnam & Ferris, supra note
3, at 690.
48. See Putnam & Ferris, supra note 3, at 690.
49. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
50. Id. at 818.
51. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987).
4. Procunier v. Navarette: Qualified Immunity Extended to Public
Prison Guards
In Procunier v. Navarette, 2 the Supreme Court extended qualified immunity
to public prison guards. 3 In that case, a state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against state prison officials alleging manipulation of the prisoner's outgoing
mail.5 4 The Court reasoned that the prison officials did not deny the prisoner's
constitutional rights because prisoners' mailing privileges had not yet been
declared a constitutional right. 5
Under a purely functional approach, Procunier seemingly suggests that
qualified immunity should extend to private prison guards. 6 Procunier, however,
did not address qualified immunity in a private context. This type of facial analysis
ignores that functional analysis is used primarily to distinguish between absolute
or qualified immunity, not to determine whether immunity itself is appropriate. 7
Thus, Procunier' s impact on immunity analysis is not helpful outside its own facts.
5. Does Qualified Immunity Extend to Private Parties?
The Supreme Court held early on that private defendants may be liable under
§ 1983 when acting under the color of law.' 8 However, the Court initially left open
the question of whether qualified immunity may apply to private defendants.' 9 As
a result, the circuits split as to whether qualified immunity extended to private
52. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
53. See id. at 565-66.
54. See id. at 556-57.
55. See id. at 565. The Court also addressed subjective good faith as a factor in determining that
qualified immunity should protect public prison guards. See id. at 565-66. However, the Court
subsequently invalidated the subjective good- faith test in analyzing qualified immunity issues because
it encouraged frivolous suits to proceed and usurped juries' fact finding responsibilities. See Harlow,
457 U.S. at 816-18.
56. Justice Scalia made this argument when advocating that private prison guards should receive
qualified immunity. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2108-09 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). However, this reasoning overlooks the fact that a functional analysis is relevant only to
distinguish between a grant of absolute or qualified immunity. See infra notes 107, 123-25, 164-67 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's traditional means of employing a functional
approach to determine whether to grant absolute or qualified immunity).
57. See supra note 56 (discussing the role of functional analysis in an immunity context).
58. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980).
59. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 n.23 (1982).
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parties. The Fifth,' Seventh,6 1 Eighth,62 Tenth,63 and Eleventh 64 Circuits held that
qualified immunity would extend to private parties, while the First, 65 Sixth,66 and
Ninth67 Circuits held that it would not.6" The other circuits have not yet addressed
the issue.
In Wyatt v. Cole,69 the Supreme Court held that qualified immunity did not
extend to private parties "faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin,
garnishment, or attachment statute. 70 In Wyatt, Cole used a state replevin statute
to gain possession of property from Wyatt, his estranged business partner.71 In a
hearing after the seizure, the trial court found the replevin invalid and ordered the
property returned to Wyatt. When Cole refused to return the property,73 Wyatt
filed a claim in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state statute
and petitioned for injunctive relief and damages. 74 The district court held, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, that Cole's conduct was entitled to qualified immunity under
§ 1983. 75 The Supreme Court determined that qualified immunity should not
extend to the respondents because immunity for private defendants was not
strongly rooted in the common law and lacked sufficient public policy justifica-
76tions.
60. See Folsom nv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1982).
61. See Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 403-06 (7th Cir. 1993).
62. See Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 850-52 (8th Cir. 1983).
63. See DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 716-17 (10th Cir. 1988).
64. See Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1323-25 (11 th Cir. 1988) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989).
65. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1978).
66. See Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
67. See Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983).
68. See generally Wagner, supra note 4, at 86-92 (discussing the split of the circuits over the
question of whether qualified immunity would extend to private defendants).
69. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
70. See id. at 168-69.
71. See id. at 159-60.
72. See id. at 160.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Miss. 1989), afftd, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.
1991).
76. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167-68. The language in Wyatt suggested that its holding was limited
to the particular facts of that case. See id. at 168-69. However, Wyatt also espoused broad language
that indicated that qualified immunity is never appropriate in a private context. See id. As a result of
the holding in Wyatt, it is unclear whether qualified immunity should extend to private defendants. See
id.
157
B. The History of Prison Privatization in the United States
Prison privatization has strong roots in the United States, beginning in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 77  During those centuries, private jailers
operated correctional facilities for a profit.78 Inmates had to make a profit for their
jailers, or at a minimum, pay their keep.79 Early in the twentieth century, state
contracts with private prison facilities dramatically decreased. 0 Nevertheless, the
concept of prisoners working to benefit theirjailers remained intact within the state
prisons."
Currently, the popularity of prison privatization has soared as the number of
inmates has continued to dramatically increase. 2 In 1983, "[s]ixty-six correctional
agencies in thirty-nine states plus the District of Columbia spent about 200 million
dollars ... on 3,215 contracts with private firms for thirty-two different services
and programs. " 3 Yet prison privatization runs the risk of sacrificing prisoners'
84civil rights in the name of budget cutting. The current debate over prison
privatization focuses on the crisis of state facilities coping with astronomical
incarceration rates versus the concern that prisoners' constitutional rights will slip
through the cracks during privatization.8
5
Questions concerning the scope of qualified immunity for private defendants
charged with § 1983 violations and the debate over prison privatization converge
in Richardson. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected a functional approach in the
context of Richardson and denied private prison guards qualified immunity. 6
Thus, Richardson reaffirmed the public/private binary analysis in determining
77. See generally David Yarden, Prisons, Profits, and the Private Sector Solution, 21 AM. J.
CRM. L. 325, 326 (1994) (reviewing PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Gary W. Bowman





82. See id. The number of inmates in state and federal prisons rose from 240,211 to 710,054
between 1975 and 1990. See id. at 325; see also Savas, supra note 1, at 896-97 (discussing the growth
of private-sector prison facilities).
83. Savas, supra note 1, at 897.
84. A potential danger exists in the private prison scenario because the presence of a profit motive
may cause private prison officials to compromise measures used to guarantee prisoners' civil rights in
exchange for higher profits. See generally Susan L. Kay, The Implications of Prison Privatization on
the Conduct of Prisoner Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 40 VAND. L. REV. 867, 886-88
(1987) (critiquing prison privatization). Granting private prison guards qualified immunity would
compound this danger because it would further insulate the private prison industry from accountability
for a violation of an inmate's constitutional rights. See id. Regardless of the profit motive rationale,
qualified immunity would undermine the legal accountability for guards who deprive inmates of
constitutional entitlements. See id.
85. See Schaffer, supra note 37, at 1049-51.
86. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2107-08 (1997).
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questions of qualified immunity for § 1983 violations.
m11. FACTS OF THE CASE
Ronnie Lee McKnight, a prisoner at Tennessee's South Central Correctional
Center ('SCCC"), filed a § 1983 action against prison guards Darryl Richardson
and John Walker.87 SCCC was a private prison facility that employed the
defendants as private prison guards.88 McKnight claimed that the guards violated
his constitutional rights when they allegedly bound him in excessively tight
physical restraints. 89 The guards asserted a defense of qualified immunity, arguing
that qualified immunity should apply to them in spite of their status as private,
rather than state, prison guards.90
The district court denied the defendants qualified immunity because they
worked for a private company instead of the government.9' On interlocutory
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, citing various
policy concerns, affirmed the district court's decision and refused to extend
qualified immunity to private prison guards.92 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether qualified immunity protects private prison
guards.93
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.94 Justice Breyer began the
opinion by outlining the procedural background of the case. 95 According to Justice
Breyer, the Court looked to Wyatt as guiding authority in determining how far
qualified immunity extended when private defendants faced § 1983 allegations.96





92. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 425 (6th Cir. 1996).
93. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2100 (1997).
94. See id. at 2103. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsburg joined the decision. See
id.
95. See id. at 2102-03; see also supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (discussing
Richardson's factual and procedural background).
96. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2103.
Among the factors raised in Wyatt and considered by the Court were the following:
(1) whether § 1983 liability should be extended to private parties even though the
primary policy underlying the statute was to prevent state actors from using their
authority to deny persons "'federally guaranteed rights' and to provide related
relief' ;97 (2) the distinction between immunity and other legal defenses; (3) history
and public policy determining whether immunity should apply to private
defendants accused of § 1983 violations; and (4) whether qualified immunity
should be limited to "'private persons.., who conspire with state officials.""
Drawing heavily on Wyatt's historical emphasis to determine the applicability
of qualified immunity in various contexts, Justice Breyer examined the historical
roots of qualified immunity as applied to private prison guards.99 First, Justice
Breyer analyzed the history of privatized prison facilities1r ° He recounted
historical instances where entire state prison systems were leased to private
individuals and companies and concluded that there was "evidence that the
common law provided mistreated prisoners in prison leasing States with remedies
against mistreatment by those private lessors."'0 ' Justice Breyer also cited
historical documents indicating that England utilized private jailers and allowed
prisoner lawsuits to recoup damages for any cruel and extreme punishment
inflicted by their private jailers. 02 While the English system provided limited
immunity for certain private defendants, Justice Breyer found no evidence that
private persons working for profit were accorded any such immunity. 3
Next, Justice Breyer examined whether the policies underlying immunity
necessitated immunity for private prison guards.' 4 Again citing Wyatt, Justice
Breyer reasoned that immunity was traditionally granted to governmental officials
97. See id. (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)).
98. See id. at 2104 (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168).
99. See id. There seems to be a consensus among those advocating a functional approach to
immunity and those that do not necessarily adhere to such an approach that the existence of immunity
at common law is paramount in determining whether a grant of immunity is presently appropriate.
Compare Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 170, 173 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (advocating a historical analysis to
determine whether immunity existed at common law for a particular class of defendants, while not
adhering to a strict functional approach), with id. at 175-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (demonstrating
a functional approach in determining whether a grant of immunity is appropriate where a similarly
situated defendant would have enjoyed immunity at common law).
100. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2104-06. In noting the historical evidence that the United States
has periodically delegated prison responsibilities to private parties, Justice Breyer observed that
"[c]orrectional services in the United States have undergone various transformations." See id. at 2104.
101. See id.; see, e.g., Dalheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-30 (1891) (holding that a private
contractor is liable for an inmate's injuries); Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 10 S.E. 435-36 (1889) (holding
that an inmate can recover from injuries sustained while in the custody of private jailers).
102. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2105 (citing 2 C. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 1016, 224-25 (1876)).
103. See id. However, Justice Breyer noted that English law did provide immunity for private
parties "such as doctors or lawyers who performed services at the behest of the sovereign." See id.
(citing Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 921 (1984)).
104. See id. at 2105-07.
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in order to allow them to perform their jobs aggressively and competently without
fear of liability." 5 Justice Breyer rejected the prison guards' argument that their
jobs were sufficiently analogous to state prison guards to merit immunity from
suit.10 6 Although the Court applied a functional analysis in determining whether
to grant absolute or qualified immunity to public employees, Justice Breyer stated
that the Court had never found that the mere performance of a governmental
function entitled private individuals to either type of immunity.' 7 Justice Breyer
found that competitive market pressures faced by private companies who manage
prison facilities nullify many of the policy rationales for extending qualified
immunity to private prison guards. 8 Unlike state prison systems, private
companies purchase mandatory insurance to compensate prisoners for civil rights
torts, °9 are unburdened by excessive state supervision, and have a profit motive to
employ guards that are neither too timid nor too aggressive. 11 0 Finally, Justice
Breyer wrote that while the looming possibility of prisoner lawsuits distracted
private prison guards, "'the risk of distraction' alone cannot be sufficient grounds
for an immunity. ""'
After concluding that qualified immunity should not protect private prison
guards from § 1983 suits, Justice Breyer closed with three provisos. 2  First,
Justice Breyer warned that the Court had only adjudicated on the issue of
immunity, and not liability in the present case." 3 Second, the Court determined the
issue of immunity within the narrow factual context of the case at bar.' 4 Finally,
the Court had not ruled on whether the defendants in the present case could raise
a good faith defense instead of qualified immunity
1 5
105. See id. at 2105 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992)). Judge Hand has written that
the fear of liability facing officials could "'dampen the ardour of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible"' public officials. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985).
106. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2106.
107. See id.; see also infra notes 123-25, 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
use of a functional analysis to determine whether to grant absolute or qualified immunity).
108. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2106.
109. Particularly in the 1980s, when § 1983 actions generated the great bulk of constitutional tort
liability cases, many criticized constitutional tort liability as contributing to an insurance premium
crisis. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 641,651 (1987).
110. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2106.
111. See id. at2107.
112. See id. at 2108.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. The Court distinguished between the immunity defense and a good faith or probable
cause affirmative defense. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 169 (1992).
B. The Minority Opinion
In a dissenting opinion," 6 Justice Scalia rejected the majority's approach
because Procunier granted state prison gqards qualified immunity against suits
raised under § 1983 and private prison guards effectively perform the same
function as their state counterparts."' Like the majority, Justice Scalia looked to
history for guidance in disposing of the qualified immunity issue raised in the
present case."' By contrast, Justice Scalia observed that the majority's historical
gloss relied upon the absence of a case granting private prison guards immunity
from lawsuits rather than any overt refusal by a common law court to grant such
immunity." 9 Justice Scalia further noted that state jailers were sometimes sued at
common law without immunity protection.2 o Yet this fact did not prevent the
Procunier Court from granting immunity to public jailers.' Instead, Justice Scalia
posited examining immunity in light of the following: "(1) immunity is determined
by function, not status, and (2) even more specifically, private status is not
disqualifying."'' l2
In championing a functional approach, Justice Scalia asserted that it was
appropriate to examine the nature of responsibilities delegated to an individual and
the impact that an overarching threat of liability would have on the discharge of
those responsibilities. 13 Justice Scalia argued that punishing criminals was a state
function and individuals engaged in such responsibilities were performing a state
function regardless of their own public or private status. 24 Justice Scalia reasoned
that immunity should extend to private prison guards because private persons
116. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2108 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined the dissent. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 2108-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted, "I agree with the Court.. . that
we must look to history to resolve this case." Id. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia went on to write that Procunier never engaged
in a historical analysis to determine whether public prison guards should receive qualified immunity,
but instead extended immunity on the basis of public policy. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover,
Justice Scalia criticized the majority's reliance on the absence of case law in limiting prison guard
immunity considering that Procunier, the case defining such immunity, was unsupported by case law.
See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 2109-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia emphasized that "[i]mmunity 'flows
not from rank or title or "location within the Government," but from the nature of the responsibilities
of the individual official."' See id. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193, 201 (1985) (quoting Burtz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978))).
124. See id. at 2110 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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traditionally received qualified immunity when performing governmental tasks.' 25
Next, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's policy arguments for denying
private jailers immunity. 26 Justice Scalia argued that the majority's reliance upon
market pressures to ameliorate the impact of private prison guards' exposure to
liability was misplaced. 27 In fact, Justice Scalia asserted that the decision as to
which company will manage a state's prison facilities ultimately rests with a
governmental official, not market pressures. 28 Justice Scalia reasoned that the
decision whether to contract with a particular private company largely rests upon
cost considerations, and therefore, exposure to liability can increase operating
costs, resulting in a company losing its contract with the state. 29 Justice Scalia
further attempted to discredit the majority's rationale by arguing that civil rights
liability insurance is no less available to the state than to private companies and,
without any type of immunity, the savings the government would achieve by
contracting with private companies will shift "from the public to prisoner-plaintiffs
and to lawyers." 1
30
Finally, Justice Scalia argued against the rationale the Court of Appeals
offered for denying immunity. 13' He suggested it was unlikely that private prison
guards would be more prone to "violate prisoners' constitutional rights because
they work for a profit motive"'13 in light of the fact that private prison managers
would be subject to pay § 1983 damages "out of their own pockets."'133 Justice
Scalia concluded by contending that neither history nor policy support a denial of
125. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, Justice Scalia's analysis ignored that the Court, in
an immunity context, utilized a functional approach to determine whether to grant absolute or qualified
immunity. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's functional approach
to immunity questions). Justice Scalia could not point to any of the Court's decisions that employ a
functional analysis to determine generally whether to grant immunity. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at
2110 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead, he relied on state court authority to support his proposition that
the Court should use a functional approach to determine whether granting immunity is appropriate. See
id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 2110-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 2111-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 109, at
651 (discussing criticisms of civil rights insurance).
131. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d
417,424 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'd, Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997) (holding that private
prison guards, "as employees of a private corporation seeking to maximize profits ... act, at least in
part, out of a desire to maintain the profitability of the corporation for whom they labor, thereby
ensuring their own job security").
132. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
qualified immunity to private prison guards from prisoner lawsuits alleging § 1983
violations.
13 4
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Immediate Impact
The Supreme Court in Richardson narrowly held that qualified immunity
should not extend to private prison guards, but did not address whether the guards
were "liable under § 1983 even though they are employed by a private prison
finn." 135 Accordingly, the circuit court will determine the guards' liability on
remand. 1
36
Similarly, the Court did not adjudicate whether private defendants may assert
a good faith defense. 37 Because Wyatt distinguished a good faith defense from
immunity, and neither Wyatt nor Richardson addressed the issue, the constitution-
ality of such a defense is still unclear.138 Therefore, on remand, the circuit court
may allow the guards a good faith defense.
B. Marginal Impact on the Number of Future Prisoner Actions Against
Private Prison Facilities
Proponents of extending qualified immunity to private prison guards argue that
Richardson will open the floodgates of prisoner litigation against private prison
firms. 139 Indeed, Justice Scalia warned that denying private guards qualified
immunity would shift the savings a state achieves by contracting with private
companies for prisoner incarceration from taxpayers to prisoners and their
lawyers.' 40 Nevertheless, this massive onslaught of prisoner litigation is unlikely.
Richardson specifically leaves open the possibility that private guards can invoke
134. See id. at 2112-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 2108.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. In Wyatt, the Court provided:
[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants faced with § 1983 liability...
could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or that
§ 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry
additional burdens. Because those issues are not fairly before us, however, we leave them for
another day.
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 169 (1992).
139. See, e.g., Schaffer, supra note 37, at 1052 ("Section 1983 suits by prisoners are common and
are costly to litigate, even though they are seldom successful.").
140. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a good faith defense.14 ' Unlike qualified immunity, a good faith defense would not
bar suit based upon functional categories,142 but would require a closer case by case
analysis. 143 Whereas qualified immunity is an objective test, a good faith defense
is a subjective test which gives district court judges the flexibility to evaluate the
subjective motivations of private prison guards.' 44 Thus, while a good faith
defense is substantively different from qualified immunity, its net impact would be
to prevent nonmeritorious § 1983 claims against private prison guards. In sum, any
explosion in § 1983 lawsuits against private prison guards as a result of their
inability to invoke a qualified immunity defense is unlikely.
C. Limited Impact on Prison Privatization
Prison privatization is a growing and lucrative business.145 The demand for
prison space will continue to grow as states look for alternative methods to cope
with astronomical incarceration rates.'46 Furthermore, privatization is slowly
gaining approval as states begin to increasingly contract out services that were
traditionally state functions. 147 Consequently, the dynamics of supply and demand
141. See id. at 2108; see also supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Richardson's
treatment of the good faith defense). Although the precise contours of a good faith defense are not yet
drawn, previous case law distinguished between a good faith defense and qualified immunity. See, e.g.,
Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169 (discussing the possibility of a good faith defense). Commentators suggest that
a good faith defense would consider subjective factors dependent upon the particular facts of any given
case. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 85-86.
142. If the Court had taken a purely functional approach in Richardson, it would have extended
qualified immunity to private prison guards because state prison guards are entitled to qualified
immunity. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1978).
143. See, e.g., Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 165-66 (characterizing qualified immunity as an objective, policy-
based doctrine establishing immunity to suit, while characterizing a good faith defense as a defense
which considers subjective motivations) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985); Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982)).
144. See id. (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16); see also supra notes
115 and 141 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions between qualified immunity and the
good faith defense).
145. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in private prisons).
146. See generally Yarden, supra note 77, at 325 (discussing the need for more prison space to
accommodate the fast growing prison population). Between 1975 and 1990, prisoners incarcerated in
state and federal prisons grew from 240,211 to 710,054. See id. A recent commentator noted that
"[t]he rate of increase in our prison population during the year 1989 would require the construction of
one 700-bed jail and one 1,600-bed prison during each and every week of the year just to keep up with
the incarceration rate." Id.
147. See Savas, supra note 1, at 890. A 1982 survey revealed that, on average, one-quarter to one-
half of the jurisdictions considered partially or wholly contracted with private companies to provide
services, including the following: "emergency medical care, ambulance service, day-care facility
operation, programs for children and the elderly, operation and management of hospitals and mental
suggest that private prison companies will thrive. Unlike state prisons, where
qualified immunity exists so that guards may exercise their duties vigorously and
without fear of liability, 48 private prisons have a financial incentive to hire guards
that will competently discharge their duties.'49 Private prison companies who
operate for profit face unique marketplace pressures that their state counterparts do
not, and will thus simply factor potential prisoner lawsuits into their operating costs
and methods. Furthermore, state prisons face stringent state supervision. 50 For
example, Tennessee requires inspectors to examine publicly operated county jails
at least once a month. 5' Tennessee law also mandates that the Tennessee
Correctional Institute conduct inspections of state prisons and report its findings
annually.'52 Conversely, private prison firms are relatively free of state supervi-
sion. '53 Although private prison companies ultimately answer to the state when it
comes time for contract renewal, 54 the state conducts no copious day-to-day
supervision. Hence, private prisons are free of excessive supervision and have
wide latitude to develop ways to absorb the costs of prisoner lawsuits.
Furthermore, under Tennessee law, private prison companies must buy
insurance that is adequate to compensate victims of civil rights torts.'55 In
Richardson, Justice Scalia argued that civil rights insurance was just as available
to the states as to private prison firms. 56 While this is undoubtedly true, it
overlooks the fact that mandating states to buy sufficient insurance to compensate
prisoners who suffer constitutional violations would financially overtax an already
burdened state-prison system.157 Moreover, the purposes of prison operators in the
public and private sector are fundamentally different in that the former operates as
a state service while the latter operates for profit.'58 These differences justify
health facilities, and operation of drg and alcohol programs .... See id.
148. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 816 (1982)).
149. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2106-07 (1997).
150. See id.
151. See id. (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 41-4-116 (Supp. 1996)).
152. See id. (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 41-4-140(a) (Supp. 1996)).
153. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 41-44-140(c)(5) (Supp. 1996) (excluding private prisons from
certain types of state monitoring).
154. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 41-24-107 (Supp. 1996).
156. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2111-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 109 and
accompanying text (discussing criticisms of civil rights liability insurance).
157. See, e.g., DiPiano, supra note 1, at 175-76 ( .State officials have discovered that tough crime
laws and rigid sentencing requirements exact a price. After the law and order binge, many are suffering
from a fiscal hangover."' (quoting W. John Moore, Paying for Punishment, NAT'L. J., March 14, 1987,
at 612).
158. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2106-07.
166
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requiring insurance for private companies but not for state facilities.5 9 The pre-
existing insurance private companies must purchase will defray prisoner lawsuits
and demonstrate that there likely will be little change in the trend toward
privatization.
D. Constitutional and Judicial Ramifications
1. A Check Against Civil Rights Violations of Prisoners
Because states do not stringently supervise private prison firms, granting
qualified immunity to private guards would mean that potential civil rights
violations committed against prisoners would go unchecked and unremedied.
1 61
Although proponents of extending qualified immunity to private guards argue other
measures could control civil rights violations,16' none of these alternatives provide
a remedy to the prisoner whose rights were violated. Moreover, proponents also
contend that private firms have a financial incentive to adequately provide for
prisoners' civil rights because a failure to do so could result in the private firm
losing its contract with the state. 62 However, this overlooks the fact that states do
not copiously supervise the private firms. 63  Hence, denying private guards
immunity means that prisoner lawsuits will operate as a check against guards
abusing prisoners' constitutional rights in the absence of rigid state supervision.
2. The Diminished Role of the Functional Analysis
Richardson stands for the proposition that "mere performance of a governmen-
tal function" does not entitle a private individual to qualified immunity, "especially
for a private person who performs a job without government supervision or
159. See id. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia is critical of using the presence of civil
rights liability insurance as ajustification for denying qualified immunity to private prison guards. See
id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that where the law does not require a private prison
firm to purchase liability insurance and the firm does not purchase it, but the firm's state counterpart
possesses liability insurance, policy would dictate granting the private guards immunity but not the
public ones. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 84, at 887-88 (arguing that extending qualified immunity to private
prison guards might encourage private prison firms "to cut comers to maximize profits").
161. See, e.g., Schaffer, supra note 37, at 1084-86 (listing monitoring by state officials, public
scrutiny, and requiring strict contractual provisions to be contained in contracts with private contractors
as non-litigation means to guarantee that private prison guards will not violate prisoners' civil rights).
162. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing the limited state supervision over
private jail facilities).
direction. ' 164 In the past, the Supreme Court utilized a functional approach when
analyzing immunity questions. 165 However, it is significant that the Court used the
functional approach only to determine whether to grant absolute or qualified
immunity, not whether a person was generally entitled to immunity. 66 Further-
more, a functional approach is particularly problematic because there is a growing
overlap between functions in which the government and private industry engage. '
67
Thus, a functional analysis may play a diminished role in determining qualified
immunity questions in a § 1983 context.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prison privatization is a logical and financially feasible solution to the
explosive growth in prison populations in recent years. 168 Private prisons assume
substantially similar tasks and responsibilities as their state counterparts, but they
exist and operate solely for a profit. Although the profit motive may assure that
private prisons conform to many of the standards to which state prison facilities
must conform, there is no per se state enforcement of these requirements. Granting
private guards qualified immunity from prisoners' § 1983 claims runs the risk of
insulating private facilities from exposure to liability for prisoners' civil rights
violations without any state regulations to check the practices of these facilities.
Therefore, Richardson guarantees that prisoners' civil rights will not slip through
the cracks of the profit motive foundation.
LORI DACOSSE
164. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2106.
165. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,268-69 (1993) (using a functional approach
to determine whether to extend absolute or qualified immunity to prosecutors); Cleavinger v. Saxner,
474 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1985) (employing a functional approach in deciding whether to grant absolute
or qualified immunity to members of a prison discipline committee).
166. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2106.
167. See, e.g., id. at 2106 (discussing the problems inherent in employing a functional analysis to
immunity questions).
168. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing statistics as to the modern growth of
incarceration rates).
